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1.  Tackling the issues in the right 
order 
The European Union is suffering a deep 
crisis: disdain, disillusionment and distrust 
top the list of prevailing sentiments towards 
the European institutions, as was brought 
home dramatically by the failed referenda on 
the Constitutional Treaty in France and the 
Netherlands.  
The diagnosis of the problem, however, and its 
attendant cure are far from clear. Is declining 
popularity a transitory effect of persistent slow 
growth and unemployment or, more fundamentally, 
of mounting social strains blamed on globalisation 
and immigration? Is it the frustration from the 
apparent inability of the European Council to reach 
agreement on vital decisions affecting the security 
and well-being of its citizens?  Is it the distance and 
complexity of common institutions, turning out an 
endless flow of cumbersome rules, seemingly 
undisturbed by objections raised from all quarters? 
And, finally, is it the perceived lack of democratic 
accountability of European institutions, the 
widespread perception that a creeping theft of 
sovereignty has expropriated citizens of their right to 
take fundamental decisions shaping their economic 
and social circumstances, changing their societies 
without consulting them? 
While these proposed explanations are not 
necessarily well founded, they do point to policy 
issues that are constantly being raised in public 
policy discourse and therefore must be given an 
appropriate response. Grievances do not amount, per 
se, to the identification of the cures, but they reflect 
to an important extent the frustrations generated by 
weak policies. For instance, widespread fears of 
integration or immigration do not provide sound 
reasons for raising barriers against the free flow of 
people and capital: protectionism would dramatically 
damage the economy without helping a bit to resolve 
social strains in our societies. Other queries appear 
more solid, such as the longstanding critique on the 
functioning and accountability of European 
institutions, systematically ignored by Brussels 
policy circles, and the various rounds of institutional 
negotiations over the past decade, including the 
Convention that led to the Constitutional Treaty. 
In some member countries, the relationship between 
domestic political opinion and policy-makers is as 
difficult as that which obtains at the EU level. It is 
not by coincidence that the distrust in the domestic 
policy-making élite is also greatest in France. The 
French electorate has been told for years that all 
successes are due to the actions of the French 
government and that all problems come either from 
Brussels or from globalisation. When the same 
political elite then tried to sell the draft Constitutional 
Treaty, it is not surprising that the outcome was a no 
to both Europe and to the domestic élite. 
Up until recently, it did not matter greatly that public 
opinion was no longer enthusiastic about European 
integration, since the elaborate compromises reached 
at the EU level were usually pushed through national 
parliaments where the governments, which had 
signed the deal, dominated the agenda. With the 
failed referenda in France and Holland, however, it is 
no longer possible to continue to rely on what was 
once called the ‘permissive consensus’. This implies 
that domestic political weakness in key countries is 
spilling over to the EU level. 
There is thus a crisis of legitimacy both at the EU 
and, in many cases, at the national level. The EU’s 
problems cannot be fully resolved until democracy is 
working satisfactorily at the national level as well. 
However, improving the functioning and democratic 
accountability of the EU as well as clarifying the 
distribution of  competences between the member 
states and the Union will not only be beneficial by 
itself, it will also clarify in many cases the terms of 
the national debate. 
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The European Council has addressed at its meetings 
the decline in popularity of the Union and the 
possibility that ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty will fail, but so far has not managed to 
develop effective responses. In June 2005, the Heads 
of State and Government called for a period of 
reflection devoted to listening to “citizens, civil 
society, social partners, national parliaments and 
political parties”. The main conclusion was that 
“citizens remain committed to the European project 
…[but] … expect the Union to prove its added 
value”. In June 2006, the European Council decided a 
“twin track” approach whereby on the one hand it 
would try to improve the “delivery of concrete 
results” from Union policies, working within existing 
treaties; on the other hand it would “continue to 
reflect” on institutional reforms and ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty. 
The presidency conclusions of that meeting vividly 
illustrate policy sensitivities at this juncture. Internal 
security comes first, with efforts to accelerate 
implementation of the Schengen acquis and 
legislative measures under consideration on border 
control and police and judicial cooperation; a “global 
approach” to migration whose main purpose is to 
mitigate migrants’ pressure on EU borders; and 
measures against terrorism, international crime and 
trafficking in human beings. Environment, energy 
and the economy come second. Due tribute is paid to 
Kyoto and the Energy Charter, the Lisbon strategy 
and the European social model; the list of policy 
goals is long but lacks focus and a clear direction. 
The instruments available to implement agreed 
policies appear weak, little more than well-meaning 
exhortations. Precise specification of objectives and 
publicity on member states’ achievements are 
avoided, lest somebody gets embarrassed. 
Tellingly, the chapter “Looking to the future” places 
institutions first and enlargement second: a reflection 
of the view that further enlargement must be 
subordinated to effective reforms of common 
institutions – but there is no agreement on what 
should be changed and how. Here too the proposed 
medication indicates where the pain is. It was agreed 
to improve transparency of Council deliberations; 
strengthen the role of national parliaments in the 
early stages of EU legislation, so as to better respect 
the principle of subsidiarity; and improve comitology 
procedures, long seen as the seat of opaque decision-
making out of sight of Parliaments and the public 
opinion. As for the Constitutional Treaty, the Council 
had little to say, except noting that some countries are 
still continuing the ratification process: code-words 
signalling the divisions over the fate of the ponderous 
document. 
Enlargement is last. At its forthcoming December 
meeting, the Council will debate “all aspects of 
further enlargement, including the Union’s capacity 
to absorb new members” since “the pace of 
enlargement must take the Union’s absorption 
capacity into account”. Accordingly, the Commission 
was asked “to provide a special report on all aspects 
pertaining to the Union’s absorption capacity”, 
notably including “the perception of enlargement by 
citizens … and the need to explain the enlargement 
process adequately to the public”. That report has 
now been published.
1 It neatly dissects the issue into 
operational questions on the functioning of 
institutions, the impact of enlargement on the EU 
budget and the ability of new member states to meet 
the obligations of membership. The ready conclusion 
is that serious impediments do not exist but better 
communication is called for to convince a reluctant 
public opinion. Unfortunately, the public opinion is 
not likely to be reassured by technical argument. 
Visible opposition to further enlargement in many 
European quarters is also generating growing 
opposition to domestic reforms in applicant countries. 
Altogether, while there are useful policy initiatives, 
the European project is in the doldrums, seemingly 
unable to re-connect to European citizens. The crux 
of the difficulty lays in the ambiguity and opacity of 
policies and goals in the areas that matter most to 
public opinion: rather than confronting disagreements 
and sorting them out, increasingly over the past 
decade the member states have concealed them in 
convoluted language, acknowledging all views and 
following none. The Commission has followed suit 
by filling its papers with ever-longer lists of goals 
where everyone could delude themselves in believing 
they had won the day. 
In order to rebuild consensus, three critical areas 
stand out in need of clarification and fresh initiative: 
the common framework for policy coordination, the 
budget and the democratic deficit in European 
institutions. The chances of success would be 
enhanced by tackling these issues in the right order. 
Policy coordination should be addressed first since it 
has a crucial role in re-establishing support for the 
goal of integration; the new budget would then be 
able to better reflect policy priorities; and, finally, the 
debate on institutions would rest on more solid 
foundations with credible policy and budgetary 
frameworks in place. 
Decisions in the three areas should be tackled 
separately, each one on its own merits, but the 
direction should be clear on all three in good time for 
the European elections in 2009 – although decisions 
on institutions might have to be postponed until later. 
It is not an impossible task if the European leaders 
really want to restore the Union’s credibility. 
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2.  Soft policy coordination that matters 
Policy coordination within the Union rests on ‘hard’ 
rules for free movement, competition policy and state 
aid, and monetary and fiscal policies; ‘soft’ 
coordination prevails everywhere else (Micossi, 
2003). The hard rules are straightforward. Free 
movement and competition policies must be 
respected, under the threat of legal sanctions; 
exceptions are allowed for well-circumscribed public 
interests. Monetary policy is centralised in the hands 
of an independent European System of Central 
Banks; fiscal policy belongs to the member states but 
must respect the constraints on yearly deficits and the 
total debt of the public sector.    
Soft coordination has its legal foundation in Articles 
98-99 (for broad economic policies) and 125-129 (for 
employment policies) of the EC Treaty. Under these 
articles, the member states shall consider economic 
and employment policies “as a matter of common 
concern” and shall coordinate them within the 
European Council. The Council adopts yearly 
common orientations and guidelines for broad 
economic policies (Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines or BEPG) and for employment; its 
members are called to report periodically on national 
implementing measures but there are no sanctions for 
failing to comply. Peer pressure is brought to bear by 
compiling ‘league’ tables that compare results and 
foster the adoption of best practices. The 
Commission provides the secretariat but has no 
power of initiative in policy design or Council 
decisions. The European Parliament is kept informed. 
This approach is known as the Open Method of 
Coordination (OCM). 
In 2000 in Lisbon the European Council adopted an 
ambitious programme of structural reform to raise 
productivity growth and accelerate the transition to a 
knowledge-based economy – the Lisbon Agenda – 
also to be pursued through the OCM. All the main 
economic and social policies were included, 
including reform of education, employment and 
welfare systems, in many areas with specified 
quantitative policy goals – even if under the treaties 
the Union has little competence in these domains. 
These broad demands for (soft) policy coordination 
placed by the member states on the European Council 
and the Council of ministers need to be explained. 
Two separate questions must be addressed. First, why 
do the member states want to coordinate their 
policies at Union level, beyond what is required by 
hard Treaty rules? And, second: if a demand for 
coordination if justified, how should the exercise be 
construed so as to make it useful and effective? 
Why coordinate polices at Union level? 
Most economists believe that there isn’t much to be 
gained from policy coordination at the Union level, 
since measured policy spillovers – say on growth, 
employment or inflation – across Union members 
appear small, notably for supply-side policies in the 
Lisbon agenda (perhaps with the exception of 
research policies). Furthermore, increased 
heterogeneity in member states’ economic and social 
structures entails rising costs of uniform policies 
(Tabellini & Wyplosz, 2004). The unavoidable 
conclusion is that national governments and 
politicians don’t know enough economics and their 
attempts at coordination are misguided. 
However, a fundamental premise of the social 
sciences is that observed behaviour reveals 
something not only about individual preferences, but 
also about the efficiency of existing institutional 
settings. In this vein, Nobel laureate Gary Becker 
famously argued that any observed amount of 
redistribution is socially optimal; and Andrew 
Moravcsik (1998) contended that Union institutional 
arrangements reflect a viable compromise between 
their policy preferences. If the same line of reasoning 
applied here, the economists have not searched for 
the right evidence. 
The EC Treaty’s paramount goal is economic 
integration through the four freedoms of movement – 
for goods, services, capital and people – and the 
creation of a Single Market (Articles 3 and 14). In 
order to sustain the free flow of trade and payments 
during the past five decades, the members of the 
European Community, later the Union, have accepted 
increasing constraints over their policy autonomy. 
Thus, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
System, at the end of the 1970s the European 
Monetary System (EMS) was created to stabilise 
exchange rates within the European Community 
(EC); in the early 1990s, crisis in the EMS – when 
the lira and pound sterling were forced out of the 
EMS by irresistible capital flows – convinced its 
members (except the UK) to surrender monetary 
policy and adopt the euro to preserve the internal 
market. The need to avoid trade disruptions 
motivated the other members of the EC to bring a 
reluctant and financially unstable Italy into the EMS 
in 1979 and into monetary union in 1998.  
This revealed preference for exchange rate stability 
calls our attention to another feature of the EC 
economic structure: the rigidity of its labour, capital 
and services markets, effectively protected from 
market forces by regulation and corporatist 
arrangements. Exchange rate adjustments were 
especially disliked because they challenged 
established equilibria between capital and labour, the 
public and private sector and the different economic 
activities. However, by enhancing integration and 
competition, over time monetary union has created 
even-stronger pressure to repudiate rigidity and 
market barriers. If prices and wages cannot adjust in 
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adjustment inevitably falls onto the labour market, 
leading to higher unemployment. 
The rigidities and protections in our economies are 
incompatible with full realisation of the internal 
market: which explains why certain parts of public 
opinion view the Union policies and the euro as a 
threat to their ‘societal model’, why the services 
directive became so controversial. In the long run the 
inability to tackle domestic rigidities, notably in the 
largest continental economies, poses a mortal threat 
to the internal market. Should Italy, or France, fail to 
accept flexibility and open markets, eventually they 
would be tempted to renege on free movement and 
abandon the euro, with destructive consequences for 
all. Policy coordination may help avert this danger. 
Therefore, there is a ‘common good’ made up by 
‘sound’ domestic policies – i.e. policies that are 
consistent with integration in the internal market in 
all the member states; this public good is likely to be 
under-produced since the external repercussions of 
domestic policies will be underplayed in national 
deliberations. This externality may well explain why 
the members states of the Union have decided to 
“regard their economic policies as a matter of 
common concern” and, accordingly, have set up 
procedures to coordinate them. They have decided to 
do it “within the European Council” and with ad hoc 
procedures because the matter does not belong to 
Community competences and the member states are 
keen to retain full control of national policies.    
As argued in IMF (2004b) and Debrun & Pisani-
Ferry (2006), the benefits of coordination are likely 
to be reinforced by ‘learning’ spillovers in reform 
policies. Among other things, structural reforms are 
resisted by public opinion, owing to their uncertainty 
about adjustment costs and their distribution; the 
exchange of information between policy-makers can 
help improve policy design and allay fears on the 
effects of reforms, thus facilitating decisions. 
Empirical evidence lends support to this view: 
reforms tend to spread in waves and follow similar 
patterns within similar countries and regions, 
indicating the relevance of imitation in national 
policy processes (IMF, 2004a). 
The existence of learning spillovers and policy 
imitation greatly enhances the importance of the 
policy message sent to the public by the European 
Council. If the policy message is clear and the 
member states can show that they mean business, a 
virtuous circle of improved expectations and 
economic performance can be set in motion. This 
would not only reduce the cost of reform; it would 
also strengthen the image of the Union to the extent 
that its citizens could again regard it as the source of 
effective solutions to their predicaments. 
What policy goals? 
It follows from the above that the main goal of policy 
coordination at Union level is to build consensus on 
market-oriented structural reform, to convince a 
scared public opinion that economic integration and 
free movement are likely to improve their economic 
conditions rather than imperil them. Hard policy rules 
are not sufficient to this end; indeed, in recent years 
they have often been viewed as an unbearable 
limitation to domestic policy autonomy.   
The message sent out by the European Council on the 
direction of economic policies has been muddled: we 
must change at the same time that our ‘social model’ 
must be preserved; we need market-opening 
measures in services but want to preserve many 
special protections – e.g. for public services 
employees, regulated professions, small shop-keepers 
and university professors – well beyond what is 
justified by public interests; and, finally, more 
flexibility and adaptability of labour are desirable but 
greater spending in education and research might 
improve productivity without reducing employment 
protection. 
The message is muddled because the European 
Council is divided on the appropriate medicine for 
Europe’s low growth: some countries advocate 
expansionary budgetary polices as an alternative to 
market-opening measures; they would also like to 
mute the effects of tax competition on private capital 
flows by imposing minimum tax rates on corporate 
income. Other countries place the emphasis on 
supply-side measures; they argue that capital will 
shun high-taxation countries and that the Union 
should aim at creating an economic, social and 
institutional environment favourable to 
entrepreneurship and risk-taking. They have on their 
side massive empirical evidence showing that public 
spending cannot create sustained growth; that 
market-opening reforms always lead to higher growth 
and lower unemployment; that the efficacy of 
research and infrastructure investment is predicated 
on a favourable economic environment. 
Unless this disagreement is resolved, there can be no 
clear policy message and public opinion will continue 
to regard the European Council as an ineffective, 
even irrelevant sounding board. A strong message 
can only be founded on a credible policy framework 
centred on renewed commitment to the goals of 
integration and flexible economic structures. 
Otherwise, the entire European project cannot 
advance and will remain vulnerable to the sirens of 
protectionism. 
At the same time, citizens must be reassured that they 
will be helped in meeting the challenge of integration 
and globalisation; that appropriate polices can 
increase the number of those who will gain from 
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initially stand to lose. There are plenty of success 
stories in the Union that may be shown to allay 
public fears and may be replicated. Compromise and 
ambiguity in policy goals have diverted attention 
from the real question to be tackled, which is to 
manage adjustment properly, rather than resist it, and 
convince citizens that they will not be left alone. In 
this regard, two critical policy areas stand out: 
employment protection and immigration. 
From employment to income protection 
Outdated labour market rules are main reason why 
the full benefits of the internal market and monetary 
union have failed to materialise, and productivity and 
innovation stagnate (Sapir, 2005). They are a main 
source of insecurity for ‘insiders’, i.e. protected 
workers, who see their corporatist shields crumbling 
under the thrust of globalisation and technological 
change and oppose change only to gain time; their 
protection prevents ‘outsiders’ from getting stable 
jobs and confines them to a precarious life of 
exclusion. The insecurity of both groups provides 
fertile ground for fomenting anti-Union sentiments. 
The experiences of successful reform in Anglo-Saxon 
and Nordic European countries show that we are not 
condemned to stagnation and decline, provided we 
are ready to adapt our economic and social 
institutions. Rigid employment protection should be 
replaced by temporary income protection and active 
support to accompany affected workers to a new job; 
thus, resources could flow more easily to new sectors 
and innovative activities. The gradual elimination of 
dual labour-market arrangements would boost equity 
in our societies together with economic efficiency: a 
recent study shows that in the long run dual labour 
markets damage human capital, with permanent 
adverse effects on productivity and the growth 
potential (cf. Allard & Lindert, 2006). 
The European Council has a crucial role to play in 
building support for the right policies in this domain 
– but so far has shirked from taking a clear stand. Its 
message would be heard more distinctly if it was 
simple and direct, indicating the desirability of 
precise policy measures: for instance, it could 
recommend that the required relaxation of 
employment protection be accompanied by a Union-
wide minimum wage and an unemployment subsidy 
equal to the minimum wage – to be set somewhere 
between 50 and 70% of the statutory wage for regular 
long-term employment of low-skilled workers. 
Active labour market polices, as already applied with 
success in a number of EU countries, would ensure 
training and reemployment to those displaced by 
restructuring. The endorsement by the European 
Council of such a comprehensive and coherent policy 
package would help reduce the public’s resistance to 
reform and encourage irresolute governments to act. 
Welfare policies and migration permits 
Immigration poses even more difficult challenges for 
free movement, since it is broadly perceived as a 
main source of economic insecurity; immigrants are 
also seen as posing a threat to the availability of 
social services for poor natives. These fears breed 
opposition to enlargement. In a 2006 survey by 
Eurobarometer on “The future of Europe”, 63% of 
respondents in the EU-15 believed that enlargement 
would increase unemployment, up from 43% in 
2003; this percentage was above 70% in Austria and 
France (Grant, 2006).  
The Union dimension of the issue is enhanced by 
substantial policy spillovers. There is evidence that 
restrictions and selection systems in one country 
divert migrants’ flows to other countries in the Union 
(Brücker, 2006); migration is attracted by generous 
welfare entitlements and their redistribution 
component (Boeri, 2006), which in some member 
states has already led to a selective lowering of 
welfare entitlements. Moreover, immigration is 
absorbed more smoothly in well-functioning labour 
markets, which attract migrants with higher 
qualifications; while countries with rigid employment 
protection tend to attract low-skilled migrants, with 
direct impact on the wages and jobs of low-paid 
native workers. Labour migration also presents a 
number of challenges for source countries, which 
may see their pool of young and educated 
substantially diminished. 
Thus, the task of policy coordination in the European 
Council is well identified: it must contribute effective 
remedies to the negative spillovers that may result 
from uncoordinated national policies.  
First of all, immigration from new member states 
since 2004 has been considerably larger than 
expected, notably into countries that opened the door 
without transitional measures. However, available 
evidence would not indicate any strong job 
displacement in receiving countries; in many cases, 
labour inflows from enlargement countries alleviated 
labour market shortages and supported an increased 
activity rate of the native populations (Heinz & 
Ward-Warmedinger, 2006). The adverse impact on 
low wages in receiving countries is likely to have 
been more significant, given existing wage 
differentials between the EU-15 and enlargement 
countries, but conclusive evidence is yet lacking. On 
welfare services, migrants are over-represented 
among recipients of non-contributory social transfers, 
such as social assistance and housing benefits (Boeri, 
2006); on the other hand, they are in general net 
contributors to pension systems and public budgets. It 
should also be noted that migrants from within the 
Union countries often intend to return to their country 
of origin as soon as conditions permit; the evidence 
from previous enlargements confirms that initial 
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2006). This fact and the substantial flows of 
remittances to relatives left behind also mitigate fears 
of large adverse effects of migration on source 
countries. Of course, for all these various effects it is 
not easy to disentangle the general impact of 
migration from the specific effects of intra-EU 
migration flows, which represent a lesser share of the 
total (cf. OECD, 2006). 
However, better communication of economic data is 
not likely to change deeply-held beliefs. Appropriate 
policies to manage immigration flows and access to 
welfare polices are also required, while avoiding the 
danger of creating different classes of citizens and 
preserving uniform treatment of workers in similar 
conditions. 
The adoption of a minimum wage and unemployment 
subsidy would go a long way towards counteracting 
the perception of migrants inducing lower wages for 
low-skilled native workers; a common Union 
framework would act as a sort of ‘welfare floor’ and 
generalised safety net against poverty, thus mitigating 
the diversionary effects of different labour market 
rules in the member states (Atkinson, 1998). The 
Union social funds – which aren’t very well spent at 
present – could be utilised to support these welfare 
payments in poorer regions, as suggested by Boeri 
(2006), giving also the Union some monitoring 
powers. The image of the Union could benefit 
enormously from such a scheme, which would 
directly address societal fears and project a message 
of fairness over the entire European society. 
On the other hand, the Union should try to discourage 
selective exclusion of immigrants from welfare 
benefits. The US experience shows that a 
decentralised system discriminating against 
immigrants is not likely to be politically sustainable; 
in all likelihood it will eventually be challenged 
before EU courts (Boeri, 2006). 
The second measure that should be rapidly pushed 
forward by the European Council is a common 
scheme for admission of immigrant workers from 
third countries to the Union, as the European 
Commission has already suggested with its Policy 
Plan on Legal Migration (European Commission, 
2005b), so as to provide a framework of rights to all 
third-country nationals in legal employment in the 
Union but not yet entitled to long-term residence. 
Specific measures are envisaged to deal with highly 
skilled workers, temporary and seasonal workers and 
trainees. 
The general criteria for admission should include the 
existence of a work contract and an ‘economic need’ 
test, as suggested by the Commission, but could go 
further. As proposed, amongst others, by Boeri 
(2006) and von Weizsäcker (2006), it should also 
include a ‘point system’ for the selection of 
applicants for residence and work permits. A point 
system allocates each application a score based on 
objective criteria, typically including language 
abilities, education and experience; successful 
experiments have been tried in Australia, New 
Zealand and Switzerland; the UK and Germany are 
moving in that direction. 
By combining a common legal framework with a 
point-based admission system and a ‘welfare floor’ as 
described, the Union would achieve several important 
results: it would create a level playing field in the 
labour markets; it would raise the growth impact of 
immigration, owing to its higher skill content; and the 
unskilled and those with criminal records would find 
it more difficult to come. As a result, there is ground 
to hope that native workers would be less fearful of 
immigration and would reduce their opposition to the 
free flow of labour within the Union and further 
enlargement. 
Making soft coordination bite 
We have established that the European Council has 
legitimately tried to develop a common framework 
for the coordination of the economic polices of the 
member states. The OCM was chosen as the 
implementing method because ‘hard’ rules and the 
Community method cannot apply: economic policies 
remain a central prerogative of national governments 
and parliaments and, in addition, efficient uniform 
policies across the member states would be 
impossible to design, given the wide differences in 
economic structures and policy preferences. 
Soft coordination via the OCM provides an 
appropriately flexible framework whereby the 
European Council identifies the common goals and 
the member states decide the appropriate measures to 
get there. However, results in the implementation of 
the Lisbon agenda have been disappointing. A report 
commissioned by the European Council in 2004 
accurately described the reasons of failure (Kok, 
2004): too many and incoherent policy goals, 
confusion of responsibility between the Union 
institutions and the members states and weak 
implementation at national level. Moreover, public 
opinion was led to believe that all policies were in the 
hands of the Union, leading to disillusionment and 
frustration when it became apparent that the Union, 
left alone, was powerless. The report suggested that 
the member states should take explicit primary 
responsibility for implementing well-identified 
reform polices; that procedures for peer review 
should be strengthened by stronger publicity on 
national results and ‘naming and shaming’ the 
laggards; and that Union polices, including the 
budget, should better reflect Lisbon priorities. 
Accordingly, in 2005 the Commission published its 
policy recommendations to the spring meeting of the 
European Council (European Commission, 2005a); 
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Report, it was unable to present a simplified and 
meaningful list of goals. The Council, for its part, 
decided not to follow the Commission’s 
recommendations on the strengthening of peer review 
procedures; as a result, the benchmarking and 
publication of policy results has de facto been 
abandoned. Finally, as documented by Pisani-Ferry 
& Sapir (2006), the national ‘integrated’ economic 
programmes for the implementation of the Lisbon 
agenda have in the main remained pious intentions. 
Therefore, soft policy coordination in the European 
Council remains ineffective and without teeth. 
There is no magic formula to resolve the problem; the 
Kok recommendations appear fully valid and should 
be taken seriously. The European Council must 
concentrate its policy goals on the protection of the 
internal market and integration; and must effectively 
allocate the responsibilities for their implementation 
and obtain serious commitment by the member states 
to do their share. Peer pressure must be strengthened, 
benchmarking should be resumed. The spring 
meeting of the Council offers the opportunity to 
review the state of affairs and bring new life to soft 
policy coordination.  
3.  Priorities and decision-making for the 
EU budget
2 
At present the European Union’s budget contributes 
to the disillusionment and distrust of the population. 
The problem is that it does not reflect the priorities of 
EU citizens. Over 40% of spending supports 
agriculture, a declining sector which employs less 
than 5% of the labour force.  Outlays for research and 
innovation, the main drivers of productivity growth, 
are too small to be effective and this obvious 
contradiction with the priorities loudly proclaimed by 
the Council affects the credibility of the EU’s entire 
growth strategy. Moreover, there is very little money 
for the new public goods of domestic and external 
security that public opinion demands.  
However, reform is impossible as long as the budget 
is determined in an intergovernmental European 
Council negotiation in which no one defends the 
over-arching European interest, since all member 
countries care only about their ‘net balance’ of 
contributions to or from the EU. Radical changes are 
thus needed both in the content of the budget – its 
revenues and spending programmes – and decision-
making procedures to endow the Union with an 
effective instrument to foster its policy goals. Only 
with a new procedure, one in which European 
interests dominate, could the Union design a better 
budget. The European Parliament, which represents 
European citizens directly, must be given the main 
say in the budget’s structure, while the European 
                                                  
2 This section is based on Gros & Micossi (2005). 
Council of the member states’ national leaders should 
provide appropriate safeguards against excessive 
spending. Movement in this direction can start 
immediately, even within the present legislative 
framework. 
The impasse after voters’ rejection of the draft EU 
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands 
only increases the need for reform along these lines. 
We now know that the electorate rejects the outcome 
of intergovernmental negotiations that often reflect 
more the positions of special interest groups than 
those of the EU population. 
That the EU budget no longer reflects the Union’s 
main missions and policy goals is now clear. How 
did this come about?  Decades ago the rationale for 
farm and regional aid, the items that now dominate 
the allocations, was the perception that Europe had to 
ensure its own food supplies and that poorer member 
countries had to be bribed to accept the internal 
market and monetary union. But the main legacy 
today of the ‘founding’ compromises on agricultural 
and structural funds is that the budget is basically 
seen as a tool for redistributing money between 
member states rather than fostering common goals.  
This implies that in the intergovernmental 
negotiations that determine the budget no voice 
promotes overall EU interests. For any individual 
member country, the return from defending an all-
encompassing EU-wide interest is negligible against 
the return from changing the budget in a way that 
might lead to lower overall efficiency, but still gives 
more money to its own country. 
Moreover, the increasing detachment of the budget 
from the Union’s own objectives is reinforced by 
decision-making procedures that ensure rigidity in 
budgetary allocations. Decisions on the overall 
resource ceiling and the allocation of spending 
among the main budget headings are laid out in the 
multi-year financial perspective (MYFP) for seven 
years. Besides, decisions on agriculture and other 
multi-year programmes like research are often taken 
outside the regular budgetary procedures and within a 
different time frame. 
The current MYFP (valid 2007-13) does not contain 
meaningful movement in the right direction. Reform 
continues to be prejudged by the Franco-German deal 
of 2002 to block further reform of agricultural 
policies until 2013. Only if this obstacle can be 
removed can there be hope that the review of the 
budget scheduled for 2007-08 will lead to reform. 
As long as the exorbitant farm subsidies remain, the 
intention to limit appropriation commitments to 1% 
of GDP has shifted most of the adjustment burden 
onto structural funds – with all the bitter rows and 
standoffs between old recipients and new entrants 
that this has implied. There has been insufficient 
room for the desirable shift of resources in favour of 8 | Micossi & Gros 
research, education, and institution-building that is 
badly needed to reignite growth, or the new 
requirements in foreign policy, defence and internal 
security. 
Rejection of the draft EU Constitutional Treaty in the 
referenda in France and the Netherlands should 
trigger a fundamental rethink of the Union budget. 
Radical changes are needed both in the content of the 
budget – its revenues and spending programmes – 
and decision-making procedures to endow the Union 
with an effective instrument to foster its policy goals. 
Only with a new procedure, one in which European 
interests rather than national special interests 
dominate, could the EU come up with a better 
budget.  The combination of the scheduled review of 
the budget and the ongoing re-thinking of the role of 
the institutions provides an opportunity for reform. 
The fate of the referenda shows that citizens must be 
made fully aware of what the EU is doing, so they 
can decide intelligently on the money they are willing 
to devote to the Union. The European Parliament, 
which is the citizens’ direct representative in 
European institutions, must be given the main say in 
budgetary decisions (with appropriate safeguards 
against excessive spending). The debate on these 
changes should be opened immediately. The nature 
of the budgetary process could be changed radically 
if a political agreement can be reached on what is 
needed. 
What priorities? 
Does the Union now require a much bigger budget to 
fulfil its mission? Historically, the first aim of the EU 
was to open markets and integrate national 
economies. By now market integration has been 
largely achieved for manufactured products, although 
not yet for services – but the latter function is mainly 
regulatory and does not require substantial spending 
at the EU level. Greater resources would essentially 
be needed only to strengthen market surveillance and 
enforcement at national level. 
The adoption of a common currency is also not an 
argument for more spending at the Union level. EMU 
too can be run without a large central budget, since 
fiscal policy has clearly been left in the hands of the 
member states. Even if anti-cyclical stabilisation 
were entrusted to the Union, this would not seem to 
require a large budget. It could be undertaken simply 
by coordinating national budgets; and asymmetric 
shocks could be handled by establishing a common 
insurance fund to provide appropriate (temporary) 
financial assistance to affected countries. 
As for the common agricultural policy (CAP), there 
is broad agreement that all subsidies and price 
supports should be phased out, and that their place 
should be taken by direct payments to farmers and 
rural development programmes. Furthermore, it is 
clear that member states are in a better position than 
the EU to execute such a ‘new’ agricultural policy, 
which basically entails inter-personal redistribution 
and local development. 
Farm spending is a major distorting factor in the EU 
economy and a distinct obstacle to implementation of 
the Lisbon agenda of liberalising European 
economies. The new members of the Union have 
relative large agricultural sectors and are thus keen to 
keep expenditures high.  But in fact they are likely to 
suffer most if present levels continue, since the CAP 
pushes relative prices and incomes to favour 
agriculture and thus discourages investment in 
industry and services, where the potential for 
technical progress and productivity increase is much 
larger. Moreover, EU external development aid is 
made ineffective and crippled politically by the 
barriers to farm imports that are maintained because 
of the CAP. 
Historically, farm subsidies have been a major source 
of tension between the member states, because of the 
skewed distribution of payments and their impact on 
countries’ net balances vis-à-vis the EU. There is a 
strong positive relation between agricultural spending 
and the size of countries’ net balances with the 
Union. Phasing out the CAP would help restore a 
climate of solidarity and shared interest in future 
negotiations on the budget and new budgetary rules. 
When the EU’s internal market programme was 
launched and plans for EMU began to take form, it 
was argued that the EU needed to compensate poorer 
member countries for taking a risk by exposing their 
weak economies to full competition and by agreeing 
to plans for a common currency that would require 
budgetary discipline on their part. Structural funds 
have thus represented the concrete expression of 
solidarity between the member states and their 
people, as the Maastricht Treaty explicitly 
recognises. This arrangement is necessary for an 
effective functioning of the Union’s political 
institutions. 
Financing under this heading should therefore 
continue to exist – but it should also be clear that 
such support cannot last forever and should be 
phased out as the newcomers’ standards of living rise 
as a result of integration. To this end, eligibility 
should be based on objective and transparent criteria 
and include incentives to reward the best performers, 
enhancing the perception of structural funds policy as 
a European public good. 
Indeed, public policies can play an important role in 
raising productivity, growth and employment. Yet 
more generous public spending will not work unless 
there is an economic and social environment open to 
competition, risk-taking, and change. Without this, 
higher public investment would not succeed and 
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for the European Union to play is that of a catalyst 
for better policies, with success dependent on 
national policies. 
The one exception might be research and 
development, which constitutes a typical public good 
whose benefits extend far beyond national 
boundaries. Recent research suggests that R&D is a 
key growth factor. Here a substantial increase would 
be justified in EU funding of public and private 
research centres and networks of excellence in all 
sciences, and in enhancing the mobility of 
researchers.  
More resources cannot be justified, however, unless 
EU funds are spent more productively. The present 
system, in which priorities in the Framework 
Programmes are the result of political negotiations in 
the Council and funds are disbursed by the European 
Commission, leads to a wasteful multiplication of 
priorities and fragmentation of grants. It should be 
dismantled. 
Increased EU funding alone, of course, cannot bring 
European R&D to the level required to realise the 
EU’s proclaimed goals of building a ‘knowledge 
society’. More than 90% of all R&D spending in 
Europe remains at the national level. And R&D 
spending in Europe in any case yields a much lower 
return than its US counterpart in terms of 
commercially exploitable ideas. The objective should 
be not just to increase the quantity, but also to 
improve the efficacy of European research spending. 
The best way to do this is to open the market. 
National R&D funding – including all national 
science support programmes – should be open to 
Union-wide competition. 
It is useful to consider as well other new functions 
(‘public goods’) that the Union usefully can and 
should take up on a much larger scale, such as 
internal and external security and foreign policy. 
With the free movement of people within the EU, the 
need for a common approach to guarding external 
borders and combating international crime has 
become evident; over time, common institutions will 
be required in this field. In a Union that is soon to 
have 27 members, a matrix of bilateral liaison 
officers among national policy agencies has over 700 
different points of contact. The sheer force of 
complexity of an intergovernmental approach 
strongly suggests that this area must be run under the 
Community approach. A European FBI, a European 
Border Guard and a European prosecutor might well 
be operating by the time the next MYFP is discussed 
in the 2010s. The economies of scale present in the 
field of external security have been forcefully 
illustrated in recent conflicts, from Kosovo to Iraq 
and Lebanon. When member states do not coordinate 
their policies and pool their means, Europe does not 
count.  
This brief discussion suggests one guiding principle 
for the EU budget: expenditure at the EU level is 
appropriate only if needed to safeguard a European 
public good. Over time, this simple principle should 
become fully internalised in the structure of the EU 
budget. There is no justification for spending, over 
decades, a major part of the EU’s scarce resources on 
a declining industry such as agriculture. Substantial 
resources must still be devoted to promoting income 
convergence, which is needed to preserve the 
political cohesion that allows the EU to work 
efficiently. And the role of the Union in fostering 
productivity, growth and employment should 
increase, with a strong focus on human capital and 
research.  
Altogether, this does not seem to require a major 
increase in EU resources. One percent of aggregate 
GDP/GNI would provide adequate margins for the 
Union to perform effectively the tasks that have been 
described – if we are able to put money where it is 
needed, rather than continuing to yield to the 
demands of organised lobbies.  
How to get a better budget? 
The distorted allocation in the current budget is no 
accident of history. As argued above, it is the 
outcome one would expect from current decision-
making procedures. They need to be changed. At 
present they only reinforce the anachronistic structure 
of EU budgets. The system of own resources is 
decided by the Council by unanimous vote, based on 
a proposal by the Commission, after consultation 
with the European Parliament. The decision thus 
taken is then recommended for adoption by the 
member states “in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements” (Article 269 of the EC 
Treaty). 
Decisions on the yearly budget are taken by the 
Council (by qualified majority) and Parliament (by 
absolute majority) together (Article 272); the Council 
has the last say over “compulsory” expenditures, 
including, notably, the CAP, and Parliament has the 
last say over the rest of the budget. The Commission 
prepares the preliminary draft budget but 
subsequently has no formal role in the decision. It is, 
however, responsible for executing the budget. 
The system of the MYFP was agreed to at the end of 
the 1980s, after years of bitter confrontation between 
Council and Parliament. Under this new system, the 
Council prescribes by unanimity the MYFP, 
including annual ceilings for total resources and the 
main headings of spending, for a period of between 
five and seven years. The initial proposal is prepared 
by the Commission, but the Council may modify it. 
The European Parliament negotiates with the Council 
and then votes on a resolution to accept the Council 
decision by absolute majority of its members. In 
practice, Parliament has had little influence on the 10 | Micossi & Gros 
main figures – for the CAP and structural spending – 
but has used the opportunity to exact concessions on 
its own programmes and exert influence on yearly 
budgets. The MYFP projections are then enshrined in 
an inter-institutional agreement that binds Council, 
Commission, and Parliament to “loyal cooperation” 
in yearly budgetary decisions, and, notably, to respect 
annual expenditure ceilings. 
This system has three main drawbacks.  
1.  First, the yearly budget – which is the instrument 
with legal value under the treaty – is not the real 
seat of budgetary decisions, which are taken 
elsewhere.  
2.  Second, all significant decisions are taken by the 
Council, outside the Community method and 
based on intergovernmental negotiations in 
which every member state has veto power.  
3.  Third, the MYFP figures are adopted for time 
periods that are completely disconnected from 
the incumbencies of legislatures and Commission 
tenure. 
Clearly, the Union will not have a proper budget until 
both the MYFP and the yearly budget will be truly 
co-decided by Council and Parliament, based on a 
(non-binding) Commission proposal. However, this 
decision-making power should not be extended so far 
as to override the decision on the total resources 
ceiling, since the latter impinges on national 
parliaments’ taxation powers. This constraint is 
essential, since the European Parliament is likely to 
have a bias in favour of more spending at the 
European level. 
Here it should be kept in mind there are a number of 
areas where the greater European interest might best 
be served not by more spending at the EU level, but 
by other measures, such as increasing competition or 
coordinating national policies. One solution might be 
to leave the last word on total resources to the 
Council, but let the European Parliament determine 
their allocation across categories of spending. Such a 
distribution of competences would probably lead to a 
useful negotiation in which the allocation of spending 
proposed by the European Parliament would be 
accepted by the Council to the extent that it was seen 
as reflecting European interests and ‘value for 
money’. Were this not the case, the Council would 
reject the demands for a higher resource ceiling and 
cut it down to size. 
Another beneficial change that does not require any 
change to the treaty would be synchronisation of the 
reference period for the MYFP with the terms of 
office of the Parliament, so as to strengthen the 
interrelation between budgetary decisions and the 
results of the European elections. The MYFP should 
run for five years, and enter into force one year after 
the election of a new Parliament, to allow it sufficient 
time to deliberate after election.  
In this game of self-restraint, the Parliament, by 
accepting the ceiling on total expenditures, would 
gain credibility with governments and the electorate. 
In exchange, it would be allowed to assert its 
competence in deciding what European public goods 
should come from the Union budget. 
 4. Serious debate on institutions 
The debate about the future of EU institutions and the 
Constitutional Treaty appears deadlocked; the need to 
wait for the outcome of presidential elections in 
France is one reason, but not the only one.  
Although a majority of the population continues to 
favour a stronger Union in such areas as internal and 
external security and foreign policy, European 
institutions are unpopular. They are seen in public 
opinion as ineffective, remote and arrogant. The 
unabated flow of internal market legislation is 
blamed on ‘Brussels’ as something coming from 
outside, even if decisions are actually taken by a 
Council of national ministers and an elected 
Parliament. Obviously, public opinion is not well 
informed about the functioning of the European 
institutions; nevertheless, these criticisms should be 
taken seriously since they are very widely and deeply 
held. 
Listening to public complaints 
There is little doubt that European decision-making is 
cumbersome and slow; experience shows, however, 
that important decisions are taken rapidly when there 
is broad consensus – not necessarily unanimity – 
among the member states.  The problem is that 
consensus has become more difficult to reach 
amongst the old members of the Union (Emerson et 
al., 2006). A greater variety of political preferences 
provides only part of the explanation; the main 
reason is that the original equilibrium between 
constituent interests in the European construction – 
between big and small member states, between Union 
institutions, between Union and national institutions 
and regional governments, between public 
institutions and private interests – has been 
irrevocably altered and a consensus must be found on 
what constitutes the correct new balance. 
The feeling of remoteness mainly reflects weak 
political accountability. The flow of competences to 
the European Commission and Council executive 
committees has weakened the control exercised over 
them by national parliaments. Agenda-setting has 
been firmly placed in the hands of the Commission, 
which is an unelected body, and the Council, whose 
members are always happy to see issues moving to 
‘Brussels’ where deliberations often escape not only 
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competing interests within the government. The 
European Parliament has been a poor substitute in 
providing political accountability since the public is 
largely unaware of its activities and does not see it as 
a forum for public discourse, as shown by declining 
participation in European elections. 
Moravcsik (2005) has argued that lack of political 
accountability in the domains of activity of the 
Community is not very important, due to their narrow 
scope – mainly technical matters relating to internal 
market, consumer protection and the environment – 
and the existence of adequate institutional checks and 
balances in decision-making that sufficiently 
empower veto groups representing meaningful 
subsets of national polities. Similarly, Cassese (2002) 
has argued that the Union is a “composite public 
authority that embraces the member states”, which 
therefore represent an indirect legitimating force. 
Moreover, he maintains that decision-making is 
subject to continuous scrutiny by national 
bureaucracies, networked executive agencies, the 
judicial system, and private interests groups – the 
lobbying community – all of which are involved 
daily in law-making. In sum, both authors consider 
that these ‘intergovernmental’ and ‘cooperative’ 
channels provide an adequate source of legitimacy 
and accountability. 
These consideration are relevant but they do not 
eliminate the problem. The outward shift of executive 
powers over several decades has reflected the 
decreasing ability of national government to handle 
the issues effectively at national level in an 
increasingly integrated economic and social 
environment; each step was supported by powerful 
forces within the member states. However, the 
mechanisms and arrangements forged by the main 
stakeholders involved in the process to protect their 
interests have rendered decision-making opaque and 
have blurred responsibilities. Moreover, the process 
has often escaped explicit approval by national 
parliaments; the public may have supported, or not 
opposed, each increment in Union powers, but 
evidently they are increasingly unhappy with the 
overall result, which entails substantial limitations in 
national policy autonomy, and want to regain some 
direct political control (Micossi, 2002). 
Besides weak accountability, the perception of 
arrogance in the exercise of Union powers also has 
causes of its own: they notably concern the manners 
of operation of the European Commission. While the 
Commission must respond to the Parliament for the 
execution of the budget, in the minute exercise of its 
powers, it basically behaves as an unaccountable 
bureaucracy, responding to organised interests groups 
and national influences as it sees fit. It is this feature 
that makes it so important to appoint own nationals to 
sensitive jobs. 
The main countervailing force supposedly lies in the 
coordinating role of the college of Commissioners; 
however, with the increase in competences and the 
number of member states, coordination only affects 
the broad political direction; the rest is left in the 
hands of the bureaucracy, under weak control by 
Commissioners. 
Significant implementing powers in the application 
of law and the administration of financial 
programmes are in fact exercised at directorate or 
even division level. The internal machinery is 
cumbersome and the obligation to consult all services 
before proceeding with decisions has increasingly 
turned inwards the focus of officials’ efforts: since 
their overriding preoccupation is to achieve internal 
approval, once they obtain it they have little room to 
accommodate the sensible objections of those that 
will bear the consequences of their decisions.  
The Financial Regulation – enacted by Council in the 
wake of the scandals under the Santer Commission – 
has added an element of madness to the process. 
Anybody receiving financial support by the 
Commission has to satisfy abstruse conditions mainly 
designed to protect the staff from all responsibility. 
Applications for financial support and programme 
management have become incredibly burdensome; 
selection criteria are difficult to read for the outsider; 
money is disbursed every year with larger delays, but 
few complain for fear of being excluded from the 
next call. As a result, even the natural constituency of 
the Commission – the thousands of researchers and 
NGOs receiving financial support for initiatives of 
European scope – are increasingly disaffected and 
widely voicing their discontent. 
Clear choices on fundamental issues 
In Amsterdam and Nice, the member states tried to 
speed up the machinery with minimal corrections by 
changing voting rules in the Council and reducing the 
number of Commissioners. After twice failing to 
agree, they turned to comprehensive design. They did 
manage to find an agreement between the member 
states on a new Constitutional Treaty, but that text 
lacks popular support, and not only in France and the 
Netherlands where voters overwhelmingly rejected it. 
Its main flaw is that, rather than resolving 
institutional tensions, it has papered them over: by 
pretending simplification while retaining all the old 
procedures under new names; by somewhat 
strengthening subsidiarity provisions but fixing in 
iron all existing policies in Part III of the Treaty; by 
promising an end to the creeping expansion of Union 
competences while including the Charter of Rights in 
Part II, which the Commission and Court of Justice 
would have surely built up into new powers in such 
domains as individual rights and social policies 
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The Constitutional Treaty is not likely ever to enter 
into force, even if eventually 18 countries are 
expected to ratify. However, we should not delude 
ourselves into believing that evolutionary adaptation 
of existing institutions and decision-making 
procedures will suffice; something will be needed to 
take its place.  
True, the Council and the Commission have not been 
paralysed following enlargement, and the newcomers 
have used sparingly their veto powers (although 
Cyprus is doing it in matters relating to Turkey’s 
accession, with potentially explosive consequences 
for enlargement negotiations). Nevertheless, 
decision-making in the Council has become painfully 
slow, e.g. in areas of acute public concern in Pillar 
Three (Grant, 2006 and Emerson et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, as has been argued, the demands for 
simplification, decentralisation and improved 
democratic accountability seem well-founded. The 
main issue is the increasing distance between 
European decision-making and the seats of political 
representation where public choices are discussed 
and adopted under public scrutiny. 
Part I of the Constitutional Treaty text already 
includes many of the elements required to re-
establish efficacy and legitimacy in Union 
institutions. Part II and most of Part III are likely to 
face continuing opposition, as French presidential 
candidate Nikolas Sarkozy has explicitly 
acknowledged in his widely publicised September 
2006 speech for Friends of Europe – but Germany 
insists that there is no Plan B and the text should be 
retained in its entirety. What seems clear is that 
muddled compromise this time will not do and clear 
choices will be needed on a number of fundamental 
issues. Discussion should start immediately. 
The nature of the Treaty and 
subsidiarity 
A first issue that must be clarified concerns the nature 
of the Treaty. The use of the word ‘constitution’ with 
reference to what remains an international treaty 
raised a clamour of opposition and was imprudent, 
because it sent the wrong message: that the main 
purpose was not only to give constitutional status to 
certain paramount principles established by the 
European Court of Justice, such as the primacy of 
European law, but also to provide fresh legal 
foundations to all of the acquis.  In contrast,  some 
member states, many regional governments and large 
swathes of the public were asking precisely the 
opposite: a constitution in the meaning of 
constitutional federalism (Siedentop, 2000), i.e. to 
establish clear limits to the exercise of public powers 
at Union level vis-à-vis other levels of government as 
well as the private sector, and have the Union 
concentrate where its action could bring clear 
benefits to citizens. 
There are two sides to the issue, one of merit and one 
of procedures. On the merit of competences, there is 
a well established demand for stronger Union powers 
in matters of foreign policy and external and internal 
security; these are indeed the domains where some 
member states are already advancing their 
cooperation within small groups, as with the Prüm 
Treaty and various diplomatic initiatives in troubled 
areas of the world (Grant, 2006). But there is also a 
demand for the Union to scale back its activity, e.g. 
in agriculture and social policy, the environment and 
consumer protection, as well to reduce administrative 
interference in the management of programmes, as 
with structural funds and research, where the member 
states and the scientific community have distinct 
comparative advantages. 
A serious effort is also required to simplify and 
coordinate existing internal market legislation, as 
President Barroso and President Santer, before him, 
have tried to do, alas with meagre results. The 
problem here is that cumbersome legislation is not 
due to the whims of Commission officials, as too 
many observers prefer to believe; rather, it reflects 
the compromises necessary to balance the competing 
interests when legislation was negotiated. Thus, 
simplification is impossible without determined 
political support by the heads of state and 
governments in the European Council, which has 
been sorely lacking so far. 
Treaty procedures are even more important to 
reassure citizens and competing political bodies that 
the Union is serious about subsidiarity. In its Protocol 
on the Application of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, the Constitutional Treaty empowers 
national parliaments to send EU bodies a reasoned 
opinion raising issues of subsidiarity. When 
objections are raised by at least one third of national 
parliaments, the Union is obliged to review its draft; 
this share is reduced to one fourth in matters of 
freedoms, security and justice (Articles 6 and 7). 
Moreover, after legislation has been approved, the 
member states may challenge it on grounds of 
subsidiarity before the European Court of Justice, 
also on behalf of their national parliaments; the same 
prerogative is attributed to the Committee of Regions 
in matters where consultation of the Committee is 
compulsory (Article 8). 
The Convention also considered the possibility of 
scrapping Article 308 of the EC Treaty, which allows 
the Council to decide, by unanimity, to act in areas 
where there is no Community competence when they 
consider such an action necessary to “attain, in the 
course of operation of the common market, one of the 
objectives of the Community”; unfortunately, they 
retreated in the face of determined opposition by the 
Commission and traditional ‘Brussels’ policy circles. 
In fact, in recent years this article has rarely been 
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the message would be very well received by all those 
who fear that the creeping expansion of Union 
powers will not abate. 
Finally, in the domains of consumer protection and 
the environment, the Community’s powers to initiate 
legislation are ‘open-ended’; instead, they should be 
limited by reference to well-defined Community 
interests, as already is the case with internal market 
legislation under Article 95. According to Article 
153, the Community “shall contribute to protecting 
the health, safety and economic interests of 
consumers as well as to promoting their rights to 
information, education and to organise themselves in 
order to safeguard their interests”. Similarly, under 
Article 174, “Community policies on the 
environment shall contribute to pursuit” of a long list 
of environmental objectives. In neither case is 
Community action justified with reference to a 
Community dimension. On the contrary, under 
Article 95, legislation may be initiated only when 
free movement is threatened by national restrictive 
measures that pass the test of necessity and 
proportionality for the protection of legitimate 
interests under Community law. The introduction in 
the Treaty of criteria of Community value-added for 
initiating legislation in consumer protection and the 
environment would greatly help in inhibiting 
unjustified European initiatives. 
Decision-making 
The Constitutional Treaty provides a number of 
effective solutions to improve decision-making 
within the Union that should be retained, e.g. the 
double majority for voting in the Council, the 
passerelles for moving from unanimity to majority 
voting and the simplified procedures for Treaty 
revision in certain policy areas, the inclusion of the 
European Council into the Treaty framework and the 
end to the rotating presidencies in the Council. 
On the other hand, the unification of the CFSP 
special representative and the Commissioner for 
external relations is widely supported but raises 
issues that have not been satisfactorily addressed. 
The main objection is that this figure, at the same 
time vice-president of the Commission and executive 
agent of the Council, with own powers of policy 
initiatives, would irreparably weaken the president 
and upset checks and balances within the 
Commission; especially if, as envisaged, he or she 
were given coordinating powers for all external 
actions of the Community – from trade, to 
development assistance, to regulatory negotiations 
with third countries. 
Underneath this issue is another, even more 
important one, which has yet to be recognised by 
‘europhile’ policy circles. As convincingly argued by 
Giandomenico Majone (2005 and 2007), decision-
making by the Community method – whereby the 
Commission has exclusive powers to initiate 
legislation – cannot be applied to the ‘political’ tasks 
of the Union, from policy coordination to foreign 
policy and internal security, because the method is 
not democratic since the Commission is an unelected 
body. Revealed policy preferences confirm this 
contention: in practice the Community method is 
only applied to internal market matters – i.e. the 
original ‘functional’ tasks of the Community; in no 
case outside this domain has the Commission been 
given powers of initiatives and agenda-setting (cf. 
also Moravcsik, 2005).  
Therefore, the combination in the new figure of the 
‘foreign minister’ of tasks of a very different nature, 
and accountability mechanisms, as revealed by 
different decision-making, would no doubt create 
unmanageable  conflicts – among other things, due to 
the temptation for the ‘foreign minister’ to choose the 
decision-making procedure promising the easiest 
approval of his proposals. 
The undemocratic nature of the Community method 
has broader implications. While greater resort to 
majority voting in the Council is essential for 
improving decision-making in the Council, the 
Community method does not provide a general model 
of decision-making for the Union. Different decision-
making procedures reflect different balances of 
national and Community interests that cannot be 
arbitrarily altered. 
Symmetrically, the Commission cannot take up 
broadly political functions without compromising its 
tasks of impartial ‘guardian of the Treaty’. Loose talk 
of the Commission as an embryo of a future 
European government should be avoided: it can 
either be a ‘government’, elected by Parliament or 
voters, and leave its tasks of arbiter in the initiation 
and enforcement of internal market legislation to an 
independent agency, or remain the executive agency 
to foster the internal market laws. It cannot be both.  
Resuming progress 
There can be no progress on the institutional debate 
unless the issues of subsidiarity and decision-making 
are placed in their proper perspective. The public 
demands more centralisation in certain areas but less 
in others; more important, it wants to be reassured 
that the transfer ‘by stealth’ of sovereign functions is 
halted and may only happen following explicit debate 
in representative national bodies. In matters 
pertaining to the national political sphere, the public 
is not ready to consign to the Union the powers of 
setting the agenda and initiating legislation without 
its consent. 
While waiting for the French elections, the Council 
would be advised to start discussing initiatives that 
would send the right message to public opinion even 
before modifying the treaties. An immediately 14 | Micossi & Gros 
feasible action would be to start applying by 
agreement the Constitutional Treaty’s provisions on 
subsidiarity that give national parliaments the power 
to demand that pending legislation be re-examined. 
The initiative for legislative simplification launched 
by President Barroso should receive stronger support 
by the European Council, since the resistance mainly 
comes from the specialised councils of ministers and 
their committees. It should be extended to include a 
reduction in the Commission’s administrative tasks in 
programme management. Finally, reform of 
budgetary procedures could be advanced by inter-
institutional agreement. The European Parliament’s 
powers over the allocation of spending in the EU 
budget could be extended to multi-year spending 
programmes before the start of the negotiations on 
the new financial perspective. Parliamentary debates 
on the subject would then be far more meaningful to 
the public. 
5.   Conclusions 
The European Union is in deep crisis for two main 
reasons: First, the original balancing of interests 
between member states has been fundamentally 
altered by successive enlargements leading to near 
paralysis in decision-making on major issues. 
Second, public support for policy-makers and 
institutions has been dwindling due to weak policies 
in addressing the twin challenges of integration and 
globalisation. Rather than squarely confronting the 
issues, national leaders have tried to avoid hard 
choices at home and have papered over the 
differences of opinion in the European Council, thus 
sending muddled messages to the public opinion, 
fuelling a sense of impotence. One could thus argue 
that the present problems of the EU reflect a 
generalised crisis of democratic institutions in Europe 
(see recent interview in La Repubblica with Giuliano 
Amato – Giannini, 2006). It will thus be difficult to 
make the Union work properly if its member 
countries continue to wrestle with unresolved 
problems of legitimacy of their own institutions. But 
improving the working of the Union will be a first 
important step to address the wider problem of 
representative democracy in Europe. It is time that 
the European Council gets its acts together and starts 
leading the Union again. 
A fresh start is required in three critical areas: a 
coordinated policy initiative to re-establish support 
for integration and internal market policies; an 
agreement to reform the EU budget; an open 
discussion of institutional issues to confront demands 
for simplification, decentralisation and subsidiarity in 
the management of Union affairs. 
A clear time horizon should be set for decisions to be 
taken in good time before the European election of 
2009. The overhaul of policy coordination can be 
fully decided already at the spring meeting of the 
European Council. Decisions on the new budgetary 
procedures should be completed by December 2008, 
so as to let voters judge competing political forces 
also based on their proposals for the future budget of 
the Union – which the Council and the Parliament 
would then approve with the new procedures during 
the new legislature. 
Taking the 2009 elections for the European 
Parliament as a target date for action and decisions is 
important not only in order to give the Union’s 
citizens a meaningful choice, but also because this 
date should then be used as an EU election day in 
those countries where a referendum is still needed to 
approve any agreement on the institutions. 
On institutions, rapid decisions will only be possible 
if the member states can agree on a minimal Treaty 
reform based on the key provisions of Part I of the 
failed Constitutional Treaty. Were this option not 
practicable, the European Council should at least 
agree to implement immediately those provisions that 
can be adopted without Treaty reform so as to give 
more voice to national parliaments in Union affairs 
and show convincingly that the public’s demands for 
simplification, decentralisation and subsidiarity have 
been heard.                   
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